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Abstract. The moral decisions we make during this period, such as deciding whether to 
comply to quarantine rules, have unprecedented societal effects. We simulate the "escape 
from Milan" that occurred on March 7th-8th, when many travelers moved from a high-risk 
zone (Milan) to southern regions of Italy (Campania and Lazio) immediately after an 
imminent lockdown was announced. Our simulations show that as few as 41 active cases 
reaching Campania (and 52 reaching Lazio) might have caused the sudden spread of the virus 
observed afterwards in these regions. The surprising influence of the actions of few 
individuals on societal dynamics challenges our cognitive expectations - as in normal 
conditions, few "cheaters" can be easily tolerated. This situation therefore requires novel 
educational strategies that increase our awareness and understanding of the unprecedented 
effects of our individual moral decisions. 
 
Introduction 
During this COVID-19 pandemic, we are all required to make important moral decisions (1). 
Most has been written in these days concerning the complex choices that our leaders had to 
make when setting up lockdown measures, which involve a trade off between potential 
benefits (e.g., saving more lives and avoiding a collapse of health care services) and costs (e.g., 
economic costs). 
Yet not just our leaders, but also we as individuals make important moral decisions, such as 
whether or not to stick to lockdown or quarantine rules (2–4). Indeed, lockdowns and 
quarantines have been described from the beginning as altruistic acts, i.e., we should stay at 
home not (or not just) for our own sake, but especially to help others, and especially elder and 
fragile persons. 
Crucially, the moral decisions we make in this period have unprecedented effects at the 
collective level. In standard conditions, a minority of “cheaters” who break the rules (e.g., 
when voting, paying taxes or breaking traffic rules) can be tolerated and does not significantly 
affect collective dynamics (5). Rather, in this pandemic situation, even the choice of a few 
individuals may matter at the collective level - for the good or the bad. 
To illustrate the unprecedented effect of the choices of few individuals at the collective level, 
we model a paradigmatic case of moral decision: the "escape from Milan" that occurred in the 
early days of the COVID-19 spread in Italy. On March 7th, there were rumors of an imminent 
lockdown in Lombardy, which had a large number of COVID-19 cases. During the weekend of 
March 7th-8th, there was a massive escape from Milan (the biggest city of Lombardy): 
thousands of persons literally assaulted trains to reach southern regions of Italy, such as 
Campania and Lazio, where few COVID-19 had been reported. This situation was extensively 
covered and stigmatized in the Italian public debate, with public authorities and media 
accused to disclose critical information too early and travelers accused to spread the virus in 
southern regions of Italy, whose health care services were unprepared.  
 
Simulating the potential effects of escaping from Milan to southern regions 
We used the SEIR model (6) to simulate this situation, and to quantify the potential impact of 
"travelers" who putatively reached Campania - some of which may have been active COVID-19 
cases.  
COVID-19 total cases, active cases and deaths in Campania start to increase more steeply 
during the period of time comprised between March 18th and March 23rd, i.e., around 10 to 
15 days after the escape from Milan (Figure 1; circles are real data and lines are fits from 
three SEIR models). To show that this abrupt increase of COVID-19 cases constitutes a novel 
trend, and not the simple continuation of the previous trend, we trained a SEIR model with 
data from Feb 24th to March 23rd, and used it to simulate the next days. This model (called 
without-travelers, see Figure 1A-B, dashed lines) severely underestimates total cases, active 
cases and deaths in the successive days, from March 24th to April 7th (RMSE error 8.4054), 
suggesting that the trend changed around March 23rd. 
 
 
Figure 1. Simulations of COVID-19 spread in Campania. Circles are real data and lines are fits 
from different instances of the SEIR model. (A) Simulations of total cases (blue), active cases 
(red) and deaths (yellow), using without-travelers (dashed lines), with-travelers (dotted lines) 
and ground truth models (solid lines). The without-travelers and with-travelers models are 
trained using data before the vertical line and used to predict the next days. The ground truth 
model is trained with all available data. (B) Deaths. Results are the same as panel A, but rescaled 
for better visibility. (C) Reconstruction error (RMSE) of with-travelers model with a varying 
number of novel active cases. The RMSE values are computed by comparing the output of the 
simulation (from March 23th to April 5th) and the corresponding real data of deaths, active and 
total cases. All results are obtained using the same generalized SEIR model (6), which extends 
the original SEIR model (7) to cover deaths and recovered; and has been validated with public 
data of National Health Commission of China. 
 
To understand what could have caused the change, we trained another instance of the same 
SEIR model (called without-travelers, see Figure 1A-B, dotted lines) using the same data as 
before, i.e., from Feb 24th to March 23rd. However, crucially, we added a varying number (1 
to 100) of new "active cases" to the model. Our results show that a very small number (28 to 
43) of new "active cases" permits predicting very well total cases, active cases and deaths in 
the successive days, from March 24th to April 7th (the best fit is with 41 novel active cases, 
see Figure 1C; RMSE error 0.6087).  
To further validate the SEIR model, we also trained a third instance of the same SEIR model 
(called ground truth, see Figure 1, solid lines) using all the available data, from Feb 24th to 
April 7th; which unsurprisingly achieves an excellent fit (RMSE error 0.0718). 
These simulations indicate that very few novel active cases (namely, 41 cases) are sufficient to 
explain the changed COVID-19 trend in Campania, which occurred around March 18th - 23th, 
i.e., 10 - 15 days after the massive escape from Milan. This novel trend had dramatic effects: 
up until April 5th, there are 341 additional total cases and 156 additional deaths compared to 
what could have happened without 41 novel active states (compare solid and dashed lines).  
We used the same approach to simulate the case of Lazio: another favorite destination of the 
escape from Milan. Analogous to Campania, our simulation shows a changed trend of virus 
expansion around March 23rd, which can be explained by few novel active cases (Figure 2; 
RMSE of without-travelers SEIR model: 3.5261; RMSE of with-travelers SEIR model: 0.0480; 
best fit with 52 active cases). Rather, a simulation of Lombardy (whose capital is Milan) does 
not show any change of trend (RMSE of without-travelers SEIR model: 1.2523). Note that we 
selected Campania, Lazio and Lombardy for our simulations, as they are the most populated 
regions of Italy and those for which more data are available (https://github.com/pcm-
dpc/COVID-19). 
 
Figure 2. Simulations of COVID-19 spread in Lazio (A) and Lombardy (B). As for Figure 1, circles 
are real data and lines are fits from SEIR models. (A) Simulations of total cases (blue), active 
cases (red) and deaths (yellow), using without-travelers (dashed lines), with-travelers (dotted 
lines) and ground truth models (solid lines). 
 
While not all the active cases in our simulations necessarily correspond to actual travelers 
from Milan, our results strongly indicate that the choices of few individuals can have 
significant effects at the collective level. As remarked above, this is very uncommon in the 
moral decisions we usually do. Are we aware that our moral decisions in these days can be so 
impactful? 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic exposes the limits of our adaptive rationality 
When deciding whether or not to leave Milan, potential travelers were balancing their 
obvious individualistic benefits with potential dangers from the safety of themselves, their 
families and other residents of southern regions. While opportunistic reasons (8) may have 
prevailed, is it plausible that travelers also underappreciated the potential societal costs of 
their choices. 
Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic poses significant cognitive challenges to our capacity to 
correctly understand the situation and make adaptive decisions. The impending sense of 
danger, stress, urgency and isolation that we all face, together with an over-exposure to 
multiple and sometimes conflicting sources of information, all contribute to create a 
challenging context to deploy our cognitive skills.  
These problems are exacerbated by some of our cognitive biases. We are unable to correctly 
understand and predict phenomena that grow exponentially - this is called an exponential 
growth bias, and we are not aware of it (9–11). We also tend to discount steeply  (positive or 
negative) events that occur after some temporal delay, or at some spatial distance from us 
(13); and we tend to disregard information that is not compatible with our prior belief, i.e., a 
confirmation bias (12). There may be an adaptive rationality beyond these and other cognitive 
biases. Exponential phenomena (or more broadly, phenomena that start small and can 
become big very fast) are uncommon in in our daily experiences - they are not part of our 
"natural statistics". Phenomena that are far in time and space are less likely to affect us and in 
most cases discounting them is safe.  
Yet the COVID-19 pandemic challenges the adaptive rationality beyond these and other 
cognitive biases. The virus seems to propagate, at least initially, at exponential (or similar) 
rate, hence effectively "compressing" the temporal horizon that we normally consider when 
discounting; and it propagates at a global scale, making physical distance less relevant.  
This implies that we are all asked to make complex moral decisions in situations that are not 
just stressing, but also expose the limits of our adaptive rationality. We might have seen the 
effects of this problem in the moral decisions made by travelers from Milan. If travelers 
evaluated the costs of their decision in terms of a linear growth (instead of the more complex 
pattern shown by the SEIR model), they would have severely underestimated them. To give a 
measure of such underestimation, the total cases reported in Campania on April 5th are 2960, 
whereas a linear projection from the data available on March 8th (the day of the escape from 
Milan) would result in 295 total cases - the difference is a factor of ten. 
A similar underestimation of risks may help explaining other cases that are nowadays popular 
in the media, from individuals deciding to leave quarantine for a walk, to public authorities 
deciding to postpone lockdowns of companies, towns (e.g., the case of Ischgl in Austria) or 
countries. As an example of the latter, when the problems with COVID-19 were already 
apparent in China, and there were already indications that the virus was spreading in the 
north of Italy, the dangers were initially neglected. This is testified by the widespread slogan 
"Milano does not stop" (in Italian, "Milano non si ferma") and the widespread invitation to 
keep going as usual by prominent politicians (14). 
Was the Italian case an exception, perhaps given the novelty of the situation (Italy was the 
first country to experience problems with COVID-19 outside China, where the virus plausibly 
originated)? It appears that other countries, like UK and USA, failed to learn from the cases of 
China and Italy and delayed important measures. The reasons for these decisions are of 
course multifarious and cannot be reduced just to cognitive biases. Yet, it is important not to 
disregard the unusual cognitive challenges that accompany the decisions we make in these 
days - as individuals and as policy makers - which go beyond usual considerations about 
costs-benefits and uncertainty.  
 
What next? Making scientific knowledge and tools more available and understandable  
The pattern of results we discussed, with a very limited number of novel active cases 
significantly changing COVID-19 dynamics in entire regions, defies our intuitions about the 
societal costs of our individual moral decisions - and calls for an unprecedented sense of 
responsibility. While there are repeated public appeals to responsibility in the media in these 
days (e.g., campaigns to "stay home") they should be accompanied by measures that increase 
our awareness and understanding of the potential costs of our individual decisions, and the 
cognitive challenges we face. 
What we need are novel educational strategies aiming to make available for the large public 
the most relevant knowledge from cognitive and social sciences, as well as the statistical tools 
that may help us making more informed decisions. There seems to be an increased trust - and 
hope - in scientific thinking in these days; but to reach their full transformative potential, trust 
and hope should be accompanied by understanding. 
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